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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Manuel Jose Castro appeals from the judgment of the district court entered upon
the jury verdict finding him guilty of felony riot. On appeal, Castro argues the district court
abused its discretion when it determined the risk of undue prejudice from admitting
evidence of his gang affiliation did not substantially outweigh its probative value.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On June 6, 2018, a riot broke out at the Canyon County Jail between two rival
gangs, the "Northside" (Nortefios) and the "Southside" (Surefios ). (Tr., p.176, L.22 p.179, L.10.) The riot started when members of the Surefios overheard members of the
Nortefios reciting a gang chant while exercising and took exception to it. (Tr., p.176, L.22
- p.178, L.24; see State's Ex. 11, 15:07:55-15:08:45.) At the time, Castro was an inmate
at the jail and was affiliated with the Surefios. (Tr., p.133, L.2 - p.135, L.3; p.180, Ls.1016.) During the riot, Castro repeatedly punched and kicked Agustin Olvera, an inmate
associated with the Nortefios. (Tr., p.179, L.4 - p.180, L.9; State's Ex. 5, 15:08:3915:09:06; State's Ex. 11, 15:08:35-15:08:49.) After fighting Olvera, Castro stepped in
between two other inmates who were fighting nearby. (State's Ex. 7, 15:09:15-15:09:33.)
He put his hands up in a fighting stance, but he did not throw any punches before a deputy
subdued him. (Tr., p.195, L.3 -p.196, L.21; State's Ex. 7, 15:09:20-15:09:50.) The deputy
eventually left Castro to assist other deputies. (State's Ex. 7, 15:09:50-15:09:57.) Castro
then entered a shower area, and engaged in a third bout of fighting by throwing several
more punches. (State's Ex. 5, 15:09:50-15:10:20; State's Ex. 7, 15:09:48-15:10:12.)
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A grand jury indicted Castro on charges of felony riot, Idaho Code §§ 18-6401, 186402, and a felony gang enhancement, LC. § 18-8503. (R., pp.11-14.) Castro pied not
guilty, and the case was set for trial. (R., p.37.) In anticipation of trial, the state disclosed
its intent to call an expert witness to explain various aspects of gang culture. (R., pp.5960.) Castro moved for an order in limine preventing the state from introducing "any
mention of [his] gang affiliation." (R., pp.87-92.) The state subsequently filed notice under
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) seeking to introduce evidence of Castro's "gang
association( s) or gang affiliation( s)" for the purpose of demonstrating how gang relations
"were the core or primary motive for, and impetus of, the Riot." (R., pp.107-09.) The
district court determined such evidence was "very probative on issues of motive or intent,"
and that any "prejudice under 403" did not "greatly outweigh[] the probative value." (Tr.,
p.19, Ls.19-21; p.21, Ls.13-17.) Thus, the district court ruled that it would admit certain
evidence of Castro's gang affiliation at trial. (Tr., p.21, Ls.7-17.)
At trial, the state did not call its expert witness. (See generally Tr.) However, the
prosecutor did present the testimony of two lay witnesses who were inmates at the time of
the riot. (Tr., pp.173-92, 205-16.) They testified about the general nature of gang relations
within the jail, described how gang rivalry caused the riot, identified Castro as a Sureiio,
and described his role in the riot. (See Tr., pp.173-92, 205-16.)
The jury convicted Castro of felony riot. (R., p.146; Tr., p.300, L.22 - p.301, L.14.)
Thereafter, Castro admitted to the felony gang enhancement. (Tr., p.309, L.20 - p.314,
L.3.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, all indeterminate, to be
served consecutive to his other sentences. (Tr., p.333, L.23 - p.334, L.9.) Castro timely
appealed. (R., pp.187-92, 207-19.)
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ISSUE
Castro states the issue on appeal as:
1.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by determining the
risk of undue prejudice from admitting evidence of Mr. Castro's
gang affiliations did not substantially outweigh the minimal
probative value it had toward his motive.

(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Castro failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it
determined the risk of unfair prejudice from admitting evidence of Castro's gang affiliation
did not substantially outweigh its high probative value?
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ARGUMENT
Castro Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
A.

Introduction
The district court determined that the danger of unfair prejudice did not

substantially outweigh the probative value of evidence regarding Castro's gang affiliation.
Castro argues the district court abused its discretion because the court did not reach its
decision to admit such evidence in an exercise of reason.

B.

Standard Of Review
The admissibility of evidence offered for a permitted purpose under I.R.E. 404(b)

is subject to a two-tiered analysis. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188
(2009). First, the trial court must determine whether the other crime, wrong, or act, if
established, would be relevant for a purpose other than propensity. Id. The appellate court
exercises free review over this first inquiry. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 229, 178
P .3d 28, 32 (2008).
"Second, the trial court must engage in a balancing under I.R.E. 403 and determine
whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the
evidence." Grist, 147 Idaho at 52,205 P.3d at 1188. "The balancing of the probative value
and unfair prejudice of the evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge." State v.
Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569, 165 P.3d 273, 283 (2007). When a trial court's discretionary
decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to
determine whether the lower court: "(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal
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standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise ofreason." State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Determined That The
Danger Of Unfair Prejudice Did Not Substantially Outweigh The Probative Value
The district court conducted an analysis that satisfied the second tier of analysis by

weighing the probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice and determining that
any danger of unfair prejudice could be mitigated by a limiting instruction. Rule 403
permits the trial court to exclude relevant evidence if it determines that the evidence's
"probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248
P.3d 720, 722 (2010) (citing I.R.E. 403). "Under the rule, the evidence is only excluded if
the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The rule
suggests a strong preference for admissibility of relevant evidence." State v. Martin, 118
Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990) (emphasis in original). Consequently,
I.R.E. 403 "does not offer protection against evidence that is merely prejudicial in the sense
of being detrimental to a party's case." State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905,
908 (Ct. App. 1994); see also State v. Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 290, 775 P.2d 599, 604
(1989) ("[ A ]lmost all evidence in a criminal trial is demonstrably admitted to prove the
case of the state, and thus results in prejudice to a defendant."). Rather, "the rule protects
against evidence that is unfairly prejudicial, that is, if it tends to suggest decision on an
improper basis." Floyd, 125 Idaho at 654, 873 P.2d at 908.
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The risk of unfair prejudice to Castro was slight. Introducing evidence of Castro’s
affiliation with the Sureños was merely prejudicial in the sense of being detrimental to his
case. The evidence was not offered as propensity evidence, which is the type of evidence
Rule 404(b) prohibits, and consequently it did not suggest decision on an improper basis.
It was introduced only to contextualize the impetus for the riot and to demonstrate Castro’s
motive for participating. (Tr., p.286, L.6 – p.287, L.5.) When admitted for this nonpropensity purpose, the danger of unfair prejudice from this evidence’s introduction was
slight.
On the other hand, evidence of Castro’s gang affiliation was highly probative of his
motive. To demonstrate Castro’s motive, the state presented the testimony of Agustin
Olvera and Matthew Alsip who were inmates at the Canyon County Jail at the time of the
riot. (Tr., pp.173-92, 205-16.) Both inmates testified that “immediately” upon entering
the Canyon County Jail “everyone picks a side,” either Sureños or Norteños. (Tr., p.192,
L.20 – p.193, L.1; p.210, L.8 – p.211, L.6.) Olvera testified that the riot started because
some Sureños took exception to a chant that certain members of the Norteños were reciting
while working out. (Tr., p.176, L.16 – p.178, L.24.) Olvera also testified that he had been
associated with the Norteños and that his three attackers—including Castro—were
associated with the Sureños. (Tr., p.175, Ls.6-18; p.180, Ls.10-16.) Alsip, who associated
with the Sureños, testified that during the riot he had to “at least look like [he] was doing
something” or he “probably would have got like taken off on.” (Tr., p.210, Ls.20-24.)
This testimony regarding Castro’s gang affiliation was necessary to demonstrate
his motive. Olvera’s testimony explained how the mere recitation of a chant could amount
to an act of disrespect that provoked such a violent reaction from Castro and other Sureños.
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It

also

shows

that Castro,

and two other Sureﬁos, targeted him due

to his afﬁliation

with

the Norteﬁos. Alsip’s testimony corroborated Olvera’s, but also provided important insight

into

Why a member 0f the

Sureﬁos would have a motive to participate in the riot—i.e., fear

from retribution from within the gang.

Given

I.R.E. 403‘s strong preference for the

admission 0f evidence and the highly probative nature of the
evidence, the district court did not abuse

its

discretion

When

it

state’s

404(b) motive

determined that the danger

ofunfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value 0f evidence regarding
Castro’s gang afﬁliation.

Castro incorrectly asserts that the district court did not reach
exercise 0f reason.

First,

is

is

not supported by applicable law 0r the record.

incorrect.

Applicable law and the record support the weight that the
the probative value of the state’s 404(b) evidence.

that

decision in an

Castro argues that the weight the district court placed 0n the

probative value 0f the 404(b) evidence

He

its

Rule 404(b)

is

district court

placed on

The Idaho Supreme Court has explained

a rule of “inclusion Which admits evidence of other crimes 0r acts

relevant t0 an issue in the

trial,

except where

State V. Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 308,

(emphasis in original). Motive

is

it

tends to prove only criminal disposition.”

336 P.3d 232, 241 (2014)

(internal quotation omitted)

“a well-accepted method of proving the ultimate facts

necessary to establish the commission of a crime, without reliance upon an impermissible
inference from bad character.”

omitted).

m,

157 Idaho

at

308, 336 P.3d at 241 (internal quotation

Therefore, testimony regarding gang “membership” or afﬁliation

“properly admitted under I.R.E. 404(b) to demonstrate motive.”

Idaho 584, 591, 301 P.3d 242, 249 (201

1).

E

may be

State V. Almaraz, 154

Because evidence of Castro’s gang afﬁliation

did not tend t0 prove only Castro’s criminal disposition, applicable law supports the district
court’s discretionary decision t0 place weight

his

0n

that evidence for the

purpose 0f showing

motive under 404(b).
Furthermore, the record shows that the state introduced evidence of Castro’s

afﬁliation With the Sureﬁos to demonstrate his motive for participating in the riot.

pp.107—09, 160;
riot

Tr., p.18, Ls.2-7;

“was gang related” and

p.286, L.13.)

The

state’s

that inmates, like Castro,

Given the

state’s

theory 0fthe case was that the

who

motivated to d0 so because 0f their gang afﬁliations.

(R.,

participated in the riot

(T12, p.18, Ls.2-7;

were

p.286, L.13.)

theory of the case, the evidence 0f Castro’s gang afﬁliation was “highly

relevant t0 [his] motive.” (Tr., p.21, Ls.7-16.) Thus, the record supports the weight that
the district court apportioned to evidence 0f Castro’s

Second, Castro erroneously argues that the
insufﬁcient to “cure the risk of undue prejudice.”
State V. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,

gang

afﬁliation.

district court’s limiting instruction

(Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)

227 P.3d 918 (2010), Castro contends

was

Relying on

that the 404(b)

evidence introduced in this case was “so pervasive” that a limiting instruction would not
“sufﬁciently ameliorate the risk” that the jury had convicted
afﬁliation rather than
7,

guilty.

(Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)

misplaced.

1

is

0n a determination 0f Whether he
Castro

is

incorrect,

[sic]

him “because of

his

the State has proved

gang

him

and his reliance 0n Johnson

is

1

Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 178 P.3d 28 (2008), but Sheldon
inapplicable. Even Castro concedes that the key issue with the limiting instruction given

Castro also references State

V.

Sheldon was that it was generic and did not speciﬁcally refer to the particular 404(b)
evidence that the jury was supposed to ignore. (Appellant’s Brief, p.8, n.4.); Sheldon, 145
Idaho at 229 n.3, 178 P.3d at 32 n.3. In sharp contrast t0 the limiting instruction in Sheldon,
in

was unambiguous about Which evidence the jury was
consider only for a limited purpose. (R., p.160.) The instruction was also unequivocally

the limiting instruction in this case
t0

8

The

district court

recognized that the evidence was prejudicial, but gave a limiting

The

instruction that sufﬁciently mitigated the risk of unfair prejudice.

presumes

that the jury followed the district court’s instructions.

appellate court

State V. Johnson, 163

Idaho 412, 423, 245 P.3d 234, 245 (2018) (internal quotation omitted).

The

instruction

given was based off 0f Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 308, and speciﬁcally instructed the
jury that “evidence that Mr. Castro

is

allegedly afﬁliated With a gang

was admitted

limited purpose of proving intent or motive for the act 0f rioting.” (R., p.160.)
instructed that such evidence could not be considered for

purpose for Which

is

was admitted.”

instruction t0 the jury twice.

(Tr.,

(R., p.160.)

The

It

for the

further

any purpose “except the limited
district court

p.176, Ls.3-15; p.275, Ls.2-1

read this limiting
Castro has not

1.)

attempted to overcome the presumption that the jury followed the instruction. Therefore,

presuming

that the jury followed the district court’s instruction, the evidence

0f Castro’s

gang afﬁliation was considered only for the limited purpose ofproving his motive and thus
the instruction sufﬁciently mitigated the risk of unfair prejudice.

Furthermore, this case

is

distinguishable from Johnson. In Johnson, the

trial

court

admitted evidence 0f speciﬁc prior instances of similar misconduct. The defendant in that
case

was 0n

and the
abused
21.

trial for

minor daughter

The court

sister. Li. at

in the past.

666, 227 P.3d at 920.

is

Johnson, 148 Idaho

also admitted evidence that the defendant

at

666-67, 227 P.3d at 920-

had molested

his

The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that even a limiting

clear about the limited purpose for

Mr. Castro

minor daughter,

court admitted testimony from the defendant’s Wife that he had sexually

trial

their

three counts 0f lewd and lascivious conduct with his

which

was admitted: “[E]Vidence that
was admitted for the limited purpose of

that evidence

allegedly afﬁliated With a gang

proving intent 0r motive for the act of rioting.” (R., p.160.)
9

instruction could not prevent the 404(b) evidence

148 Idaho

at

Johw,

the limiting instruction here

404(b) evidence admitted in this case

Johﬂ.

show speciﬁc

that Castro

occasions.

is

The

was sufﬁcient because

substantially different

Unlike the 404(b) evidence admitted

this case did not

show

Johﬂ,

670, 227 P.3d at 924.

Unlike

in

from prejudicing the defendant.

at

Johnson’s

from the evidence admitted
trial,

the 404(b) evidence in

The evidence did not

instances ofprior similar misconduct.

had rioted 0r even engaged

district court’s instruction t0 the

crime to join, afﬁliate with, or to be a
being afﬁliated with a gang.”

in Violent 0r illegal behavior

Castro

is

.

.

not 0n

not a

trial for

Moreover, contrary t0 Castro’s

(TL, p.176, Ls.6-9.)

contention, the state did not use the evidence t0 suggest that Castro

(m

.

on prior

“It is

jury demonstrates this point:

member of a gang. Mr.

charged crimes because ofhis gang afﬁliation.

the type 0f

Tr.,

p.282, L.19

was

— p.288,

guilty 0f the

L.19; p.297,

L.2 — p.299, L.15.) The evidence here simply showed that Castro was afﬁliated with the

Sureﬁos and thus had a motive to participate in the

riot.

The

was

limiting instruction

sufﬁcient t0 prevent unfair prejudice from infecting the verdict.
In sum, the record reveals that the district court properly understood the probative

value of the evidence of Castro’s gang afﬁliation and exercised reason
decision t0 admit such evidence. Accordingly, Castro has

when

it

reached

shown n0 abuse 0f discretion

its

in

the district court’s I.R.E. 403 ruling.

D.

Any Error

In Admitting Evidence

Even if the

district court erred in

the error

was harmless beyond

Of Castro’s Gang Afﬁliation Was Harmless

admitting the evidence 0f Castro’s gang afﬁliation,

a reasonable doubt.

prejudicial. State V. Stoddard, 105 Idaho 169, 171,
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Error

is

not reversible unless

667 P.2d 272, 274

(Ct.

it is

App. 1983);

ﬂ

(“Any

I.C.R. 52

rights shall

be disregarded”).

reviewing court

is

m,

state

An error is not prejudicial,

able t0 declare

contribute to the verdict.

20 1 5). The

Which does not

error, defect, irregularity or variance

and

is

therefore harmless, if the

beyond a reasonable doubt

State V. Ruiz, 159 Idaho 722, 724,

affect substantial

that the error did not

366 P.3d 644, 646

(Ct.

has the burden of demonstrating that the alleged error was harmless.

App.

m

150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010).

The record
the verdict.

At

reveals,

trial,

beyond a reasonable doubt,

that

any error did not contribute

overwhelming evidence of Castro’s

the state presented

guilt.

to

The

prosecutor introduced thirteen separate Video recordings from the jail’s closed circuit
security cameras depicting the riot. (State’s Exs. 1-13.)

The Video recordings

members With

Castro punching and kicking rival gang

who were

show

the assistance of other Sureﬁos.

(State’s EX. 5, 15:08:39-15z09206; State’s EX. 11, 15:08:35-15z08249.)

presented the testimony of two inmates

clearly

The

state also

present during the riot and

whose

testimony corroborated the Video footage. (TL, pp.173-92, 205-16.) Olvera speciﬁcally
identiﬁed Castro as one 0f three Sureﬁos

which
5.)

left

The

him with welts and

state also introduced

their injuries,

a bloody nose. (TL, p.179, L. 12

spatter discovered after the riot.

L.16; p.188, Ls.1-

riot,

had charged him With

participating. (State’s EX. 40.)

riot

The

and

state

tells

a

woman 0n the

that jail security

pictures of

(State’s Exs.14-18;

Finally, the state introduced a Video call captured

Telmate system wherein Castro laughingly
the state

— p.180,

photographs of the inmates involved in the

and pictures 0f blood

20-25; 27-28; 30-39.)

Who had punched and kicked him during the riot,

by

the jail’s

other end of the call that

cameras had recorded him

presented minimal gang afﬁliation evidence

compared with the overwhelming evidence 0f Castro’s

11

guilt.

when

Based 0n the evidence

W

presented, coupled with the court’s limiting instruction, any error in the admission of gangrelated evidence

The
entered

was harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt.

state respectfully requests this

upon the jury verdict ﬁnding Castro

DATED this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s

judgment

guilty of felony riot.

13th day 0f November, 2019.

/s/

Justin R. Porter

JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of November, 2019, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below
by means of iCourt File and Serve:

BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/

Justin R. Porter

JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
JRP/dd
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